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1High Formalism: The Aerial View and the Colour Field
John Beck
Abstract
Laura Kurgan’s Monochrome Landscapes (2004), first exhibited in the Whitney 
Museum of American Art in New York City, consists of four oblong Cibachrome 
prints derived from digital files sourced from the commercial Ikonos and QuickBird 
satellites. The prints are ostensibly flat, depthless fields of white, green, blue and 
yellow, yet the captions provided explain that the sites represented are related to 
contested military, industrial and cartographic practices. In Kurgan’s account of 
Monochrome Landscapes, she explains that it is in dialogue with another work from 
the Whitney by abstract artist Ellsworth Kelly. This article pursues the relationship 
between formalist abstraction and satellite imaging in order to demonstrate how 
formalist strategies aimed at producing an immediate retinal response are bound up 
with contemporary uses of digital information and the truth claims such information 
can be made to substantiate. 
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The increasing public availability over the last two decades of location-based 
2information systems, previously the sole preserve of military and intelligence 
agencies, has radically altered everyday conceptions of space, rendered the use of 
satellite maps and images commonplace, and made considerations of the dilation and 
contraction of scale an ordinary function of conceptualizing the positions of things 
and of people. The relatively seamless movement between satellite maps and images, 
aerial photographs, and ground level photographs made possible by freely available 
services like Google Earth has, to a large degree, domesticated the once vertiginous 
prospect of the vertical and oblique aerial view, and the impression of optical mastery 
enabled by the capacity to move around represented space via keyboard, mouse and 
screen produces the effect of an achieved democracy of vision. At the same time, 
growing familiarity with surveillance and data-gathering technologies and their 
critical role as evidence to justify and obtain consent for military and police action 
domestically and overseas, has contributed to anxieties regarding the extent to which 
the military and security services, and increasingly corporate and commercial 
interests, are able to command, control, and utilise the accumulation of all sorts of 
data, including the details of private citizens. The massive expansion of what can be 
seen of the world – or, at least, what can be pictured -- has been accompanied by a 
powerful increase in the suspicion that much remains hidden from view; the erosion 
of privacy has accompanied the expanded vistas of the electronic realm and the 
predations of an aggressive, penetrative techno-vision have become a permanent 
aspect of 21st Century politics and culture.
Perhaps the two most obvious fields to undergo radical transformation as a 
consequence of the innovations in geographic information systems (GIS) are mapping 
and photography, areas that conventionally sit at the intersection of science and art. 
3Maps and photographs each promise a direct relationship with the real, a facticity that 
is nevertheless at odds with the complex representational strategies that contribute to 
their production. As the systems delivering information become increasingly 
automated, the presumption that interpretive input contributes to the presentation of 
data has waned. What once required the skill and judgment of teams of cartographers 
and photographers is now delivered automatically. It is here, in the disembodied 
manufacture of satellite- or drone-vision, that the challenges of the new visual order 
are most apparent. Without mediating human agency, data can easily take on a 
positivist clarity (it is what it is) while at the same time breaking free from any sense 
of function (information gathered relentlessly for its own sake). The skill required to 
interpret such information is still most often claimed to reside with those agencies 
who developed the technology: the military, security services, corporations – skills 
most often self-described as rational, objective, and functional. Yet the act of reading 
a map or photograph has never been an entirely scientific process; it requires 
conjecture, associational thinking, and an openness to doubt. 
As images derived from GIS sources have become a primary means of legitimating 
military and corporate policy, the emergence, over the last decade or so, of various 
forms of what Stephen Graham (2010) calls countergeographies has sought to 
complicate and challenge the apparent ease with which satellite and other GIS images 
have become part of the arsenal of the self-evident. The work of Eyal Weizman and 
the Forensic Architecture project (2014), based in the Centre for Research 
Architecture at Goldsmiths College, London, has undertaken a wide range of 
multidisciplinary, collaborative investigations of sites of conflict, exploitation, and 
injustice across the globe. Trevor Paglen (2006; 2009; 2010) has mapped US ‘black 
4sites’ and photographed military bases with astrophotographic equipment; pursued 
military satellites, drones, and other apparatus of the security state. Photographers like 
Jon Rafman (2011), Mishka Henner (2011) and Doug Rickard (2012) have trawled 
Google Streetview to produce exhibitions of ‘found’ images that combine 
conventional genres like street, landscape, and documentary photography with the 
bureaucratic gaze of the surveillance image.1 Laura Kurgan’s work is similarly 
interested in the ways that photographic and art history can critically engage with GIS 
images, not just through the theoretical and discursive analysis of images but through 
an engagement with form as an integral part of the code through which data is given 
meaning. 
Kurgan is Director of the Spatial Information Design Lab at the Graduate School of 
Architecture, Planning and Preservation at Columbia University. Her work is mainly 
engaged with the politics of digital location technologies and the visualization of data. 
Since the first Gulf War in the early 1990s -- the first post-Cold War conflict to see 
the US rehearse its so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) with the 
unprecedented use of information technology – Kurgan has investigated technologies 
of location, imaging and mapping in a series of practice-based projects driven, as in 
the work of Weizman, Paglen, and others, by a commitment to opening up the critical 
potential of information systems. Mapping mass graves, incarceration patterns, 
disappearing forests, and currency flows in a series of case studies from Kuwait 
(1991), Kosovo (1999), and New York (2001) to Indonesia (2010), Kurgan seeks to 
1
 For further examples of recent work concerned with mapping, information systems, 
and representation, see Abrams and Hall 2006; Bhagat and Mogel 2008; Harman 
2009; and O’Rourke 2013.
5interrogate and complicate the uses and outcomes of digital imaging technologies, 
foregrounding the complexity of interpretive procedures and the opacities and blind 
spots generated by them as well as testing the much-vaunted ‘growing global 
transparency’ promised by policy analysts. For Kurgan, a more nuanced and skeptical 
understanding of the technology requires an awareness that a new mode of viewing 
things has been introduced into the public sphere, ‘a way of viewing things close up at 
a distance in which there is no absolute scale, no anchor, no center.’ As a 
consequence,  ‘evaluating this new visibility and negotiating its reality is a lot less 
obvious’ than it is often claimed to be (Kurgan 2013: 24). 
Monochrome Landscapes
Kurgan’s project Monochrome Landscapes was first exhibited in 2004 at the Whitney 
Museum of American Art at Altria as part of a show called Architecture by Numbers. 
The project consists of four oblong, forty by eight-two inch Cibachrome prints 
derived from digital files sourced from the commercial Ikonos and QuickBird 
satellites. The geographic location of each image is provided in general terms by a 
descriptive caption and more specifically by the precise numerical values for latitude 
and longitude -- the numbers that the satellite's sensors are instructed to record. The 
resolution is given as 0.61 of a meter per pixel in three cases (from QuickBird) and 
1.0 meter per pixel in the fourth, Ikonos image. The heat value of each position is 
expressed as a number that is then assigned a standard colour. Kurgan’s four images 
are named White, Blue, Green, and Yellow, and while they are not completely 
uniform in tone – there are apparent wrinkles in the white, ripples in the blue, 
splodges on the green, and dirty marks on the yellow -- the four panels serve, in the 
6manner of a rudimentary colour chart, to correspond to those names. The broad 
insistence of the work – through its title, the simple colour values assigned to the 
panels as well as their largely blank appearance – is upon surface.2
Yet this depthlessness is only ever partial and the detailed captions, as well as the 
uneven tone of the images, shift the weight of attention toward the manner of 
complexity – the technological, computational particularities -- that has engineered 
such a reduction. White, blue, green, yellow: snow, water, trees, sand. The colours 
offer a rudimentary palette for landscape representation but the details are precise: the 
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska, slated for oil exploration during the Bush 
administration (white); the intersection of the equator and the prime meridian in the 
Atlantic Ocean, the degree zero-zero of mapping (blue); old growth rainforest in 
Cameroon, site of illegal logging (green); the Southern Desert in Iraq in the early days 
of the war (yellow). Kurgan’s selection of sites economically braids together issues of 
resource extraction and global geopolitics using the same forms of data acquisition 
and manipulation technologies mobilized to advance the actions of exploitation and 
domination taking place upon the colour-coded landscapes reproduced in the 
photographs. The refusal of the images to yield much in the way of visual information 
other than their generic colour values operates, once the locations are registered, as a 
mode of ironic whitewash: the technologies of surveillance and big data have been 
deployed to reveal their capacity not for exposure, but for concealment.
2
 The images and accompanying text for Monochrome Landscapes are available on 
Kurgan’s website: http://www.l00k.org/monochromelandscapes/monochrome-
landscapes
7Monochrome Landscapes, then, riffs on some of the contradictory signals delivered 
by the title of Kurgan’s recent book, Close Up at a Distance (2013), in which the 
project is discussed: the remote sensoring device simultaneously draws close but 
holds at bay, promises to reveal all but can pull back far enough that definition is lost. 
In this the satellites and the technologies deployed through them are but more 
powerful versions of earlier imaging devices that offered or threatened to picture 
everything that there is to see and much that there is not. And as with those other 
technologies, the data delivered by satellite imaging systems can erroneously be taken 
to be facts. Kurgan’s work with data is, in this regard, resolutely ‘para-empirical,’ a 
term she uses to signal resistance to the notion of data as the real itself. Rather, for 
Kurgan data is never more or less than representations and interpretations – there ‘is 
no such thing as raw data’ she argues (2013: 35) – and while ‘para-empirical’ holds 
tight to the concrete it also allows for enough of the ‘sense of auxiliary, almost, not 
quite,’ of ‘alongsideness and incompleteness’ to give leverage to interpretative energy 
(35).
The value of incompleteness is demonstrated in Kurgan’s essay on Monochrome 
Landscapes, which not only provides an explanation of, and context for, the 
production of the work but proceeds to probe further. By stepping into the images 
through a series of zooms, Kurgan refuses to allow the dumb regularity of the surface 
to stand and instead presses the data to yield what distance has withheld. In the 
zoomed images, the arctic remains white, though more intensely pearlescent, and the 
Atlantic stays stubbornly blue, if more leathery; but the forest is made to give up a 
freshly build road and a pair of helicopters hang over Iraq. The abstract, in these 
images, is shown to be made of the real – not the ‘objective’ as such, and its positivist 
8residues, but historical and political conditions are shown to constitute the granular 
source of the data. Faced with the monochromatic – images ‘in which every pixel 
looks pretty much alike’ – ‘it’s hard not to look for something,’ claims Kurgan, as if 
blankness itself is less a strategy of concealment and more an act of provocation 
(2013: 155).
It is hard not to look for something, and the New York Times could not see much in 
Architecture by Numbers: ‘there is little to help the visitor fathom the arcane, often 
impenetrable displays’ (Glueck 2004). The affectless passive aggression of 
Monochrome Landscapes is largely unpicked in Kurgan’s subsequent essay, but is 
this interpretation to be taken as part of the work, a belated and determined 
dismantling of the apparent autotelic sufficiency of the images? Or is it to be read 
‘alongside’, as Kurgan would have it, a paratext that runs next to and is auxiliary to 
the four panels of Monochrome Landscapes, troubling and probing them but leaving 
them frostily inert? There is certainly a playful splitting here, with Kurgan as both 
artist and critic, radical investigator and corporate data jockey. The slipperiness is part 
of the project, it seems to me, as the status of data swells and shrinks according to the 
uses to which it is put and the contexts within which it is situated. Data can be hard-
edged abstraction or a target grid, vital intelligence or dumb emptiness, but the 
problem with this capaciousness is that if data can be made to say anything at all it 
can also be made to say nothing. 
Kurgan’s presentation of the oblong monochrome panels is clearly a calculated 
alignment of digital imaging and modernist aesthetics, particularly the aesthetics of 
mid-twentieth century American painting, yet it is not obvious why. While the four 
9panels stage the scene of modern art’s autonomy – a knowingly dated move but 
successful enough at any rate that the New York Times backs off -- the unpacked and 
zoomed-in images interrogated in Kurgan’s writing give the lie to the integrity of the 
original panels and reinstalls figuration and narrative. The pictures were never really 
abstract, Kurgan reveals; they never are.
If this is the case, though, are the images even necessary? The intertwined narrative of 
Arctic oil, illegal logging, misadventures in Iraq and the history of mapping is 
compelling enough without the trick-shot of lifting helicopters out of the ochre 
ground, though that is also an effective part of the story. What is missing from this 
engagement with the not-really-concealed content of the images is a more sustained 
consideration of the form of the four panels. What if the engaged and detailed 
attention to content in Kurgan’s account of Monochrome Landscapes is a feint that 
diverts attention from the form of the panels, which are presented, after all, as an 
iteration of that most contentious of high modernist conceits, the abstract colour field? 
The more Kurgan discusses U.S. Geological Survey fact sheets about environmental 
despoliation, the more the stubborn fact of four 40 x 82-inch Cibachrome prints tends 
to recede from view. ‘There is more than a formal aesthetic at stake here – these are 
vulnerable ecologies and politically charged landscapes,’ Kurgan reminds the reader 
(2013: 153). Perhaps, but what about that formal aesthetic?
The images that comprise Monochrome Landscapes were designed, Kurgan explains, 
‘to converse formally with the work of another artist in the Whitney collection, 
Ellsworth Kelly,’ notably his screenprint Four Panels (1970-71) (2013: 153). Four 
Panels is a belated addition to Kelly’s signature red, blue and green paintings of the 
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late 1950s and early 1960s which utilize flat, tonally invariant fields of colour in hard-
edged compositions typical of post-painterly abstraction’s disavowal of gesture and 
figuration. Kelly’s four panels are monochrome oblongs of, left to right, green, black, 
red and blue. The panels of Four Panels recall the rectangles used in Kelly’s 
Spectrum paintings of 1969 rather than the geometric forms of the earlier red, green 
and blue canvases. Unlike the large paintings, where the red, green and blue shapes 
are placed in dynamic proximity, the colours in Four Panels are separated by a white 
ground or border, much as the separate monochrome Spectrum canvases are spaced at 
a uniform height along the gallery wall.
Kurgan does not elaborate on her reasons for aligning Monochrome Landscapes with 
Kelly’s work, though its blank, reductive, zero-ambiguity look is in accord with the 
map legend effect Kurgan achieves in her piece. Beyond this superficial formal 
similarity between the works, though, by associating her landscapes with Kelly’s 
colour fields, Kurgan has plugged her digital prints into the mainframe of American 
modernist abstraction at a particularly apposite juncture. The emergence of colour 
field painting at the end of the 1950s was identified and promoted by Clement 
Greenberg as a vital move in American art through the elimination of extrinsic 
conventions and preoccupations -- of depth, illusion, gesture – in order to produce a 
pure and autonomous artwork. In ‘American Type Painting’ (1955/1958), Greenberg 
celebrates in Barnett Newman, Mark Rothko, and Clifford Still’s work the rejection 
of drawing and design, what he claims is an ‘escape from geometry through geometry 
itself’ (1965: 226) as the edge of the canvas ceases to be a confining limit but an 
aspect of the work. Newman’s paintings, for Greenberg, ‘do not merge with 
surrounding space; they preserve […] their integrity and special unity. But neither do 
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they sit there in space like isolated, insulated objects; in short, they are hardly easel 
pictures -- and because they are hardly that, they have escaped the "object" (and 
luxury-object) associations that attach themselves increasingly to the easel picture. 
Newman's paintings have to be called, finally, "fields”’ (227). Ellsworth Kelly is 
made-to-order Greenberg.
There are at least two points worth considering here in relation to Greenberg’s 
establishment of the field. The first is the insistence on negation, the movement of 
painting away from what Greenberg calls ‘artiness’ and toward an essential 
realization of its medium specificity: serious art for Greenberg is about negative 
choices. The second thing to note is how much this negation is positioned as a mode 
of resistance – resistance to the luxury object, to kitsch, to incorporation into the 
degraded bourgeois order of things. For Greenberg, Newman’s paintings are self-
sufficient but not insulated from the world; rather, they claim their own particularity 
and are not translatable into something else, pushing out into the world without 
capitulating to its demands. This is not formalism as a withdrawal but as a challenge, 
a sledgehammer taken to what Rothko called the ‘familiar identity of things [that] had 
to be pulverized in order to destroy the finite associations with which our society 
increasingly enshrouds every aspect of our environment’ (Rothko 2006: 58). Read 
through this stern, hard-body formalism, Kurgan’s inscrutable, reductive monochrome 
landscapes repeat the attritional logic of Greenberg’s removal of traces of non-art and 
the content becomes the form. Yet even as the work appears to achieve this 
renunciation, Kurgan brings the content back in, insisting that there is more than a 
formal aesthetic at stake.  
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There always was more at stake, though, and I think that Kurgan’s self-cancelling 
formalism is partly a means of working through the antagonism between self-
evidence and representation staged by Greenberg’s defence of post-painterly 
abstraction. The reason it is worth doing this in the context of satellite images is 
precisely because the data generated by the technology, acknowledged by Kurgan’s 
impatience with the notion of data as the real in itself, claims the place once held for 
the autonomous art work: the supposition that data just is. The removal of gesture and 
image, what Newman called the ‘props and crutches’ of outmoded associations, might 
demonstrate a renunciation of kitsch in favor of art, but it was also something of a trap 
since by avoiding the distortions of expression through the erasure of the readable, the 
outcome was work that willfully stood for nothing (see Guilbart 1985). The 
transformation of modernist abstraction from resistant avant-garde to the official 
(high) culture of Cold War America demonstrates the fluidity with which refusal can 
be folded into complicity. Part of Kurgan’s job in works like Monochrome 
Landscapes, I think, is to reactivate the stubborn awkwardness of formalism without 
reproducing the acquiescence latent in its refusal to speak.
Formalism as Diversion
To produce an autonomous work of art, all traces of extraneous stuff – the non-art – 
has to be removed, a kind of wipe-down of all surfaces to remove evidence. The 
integrity of data as ‘raw’ implies the same untouched quality, as if the technologies 
that produce information are self-erasing, leaving only the data in itself. What drives 
this push toward the self-evident is to a large extent a consequence of a particular 
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economy of the gaze that puts a premium on immediacy of perception and 
downgrades interpretive entanglement as failure. 
In his discussion of Newman, Rothko and Still, Greenberg writes that ‘in the end 
these pictures, like all others, stand or fall by their unity as taken in at a single glance’ 
(1965: 226). While this may be the case with all pictures, the single glance is the thing 
that colour field painting relies on more than most: what there is to see must be seen 
immediately, all at once, self-evidently presented before the eyes. In this sense, the 
difference between non-figurative and figurative pictures might be said to be a 
difference between looking and reading, the first being a retinal response, the second 
an interpretive engagement. In a short text on his work published in 1969, Kelly 
writes: ‘Making art has first of all to do with honesty. My first lesson was to see 
objectively, to erase all “meaning” of the thing seen. Then only could the real 
meaning be understood and felt’ (Kelly 1996: 93). To achieve the ‘honesty’ of the 
single glance involves an erasure of all distracting complications – the props and 
crutches that might associate the work with anything other than itself. ‘Real’ meaning 
can only be understood and felt once there is nothing to left to read, no information. 
The dream of direct retinal communication, here, though, can only work through the 
removal of any trace of the labor that produces it. The resulting work thus functions 
as a kind of decoy that relies upon a single glance to determine that what is seen is all 
there is to see.
In this regard, when Kurgan says that, in pictures where there is so little to see, ‘it’s 
hard not to look for something’, she is, in formalist terms, not looking in the right 
way, or looking for too long. The single glance is not enough for Kurgan, whose need 
for something to look at recalls the philistine response to abstract painting that 
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demands the picture be of something. There must be something in the picture 
somewhere, Kurgan’s persistent gaze demands, and because the images she is 
concerned with are, while not photographs as such, images reliant on the indexical 
relation to the referent digital images have inherited from photography, she is right 
inasmuch as the indexical relationship between the picture and the thing photographed 
ought to guarantee some sort of correspondence between light emitted and its 
documentation. After all, in the end, Kurgan is not looking at paintings, however 
much her panels may be arranged to look like paintings. But to make photographic 
images that work like abstract paintings is to invite the assessment of the single 
glance – the Greenbergian test of unity and self-sufficiency – even if such a test is 
radically insufficient. As Rosalind Krauss once wrote of James Welling’s 
photographs, Kurgan’s Monochrome Landscapes hold ‘the referent at bay, creating as 
much delay as possible between seeing the image and understanding what it [is] of' 
(1989: 66). It is this delay between seeing and understanding that allows for 
misrecognition and opens up a space of narrative feedback between the opacities and 
transparencies of formalism and the satellite image.
There are, then, layers of dissimulation and deception at work here, not only in 
Kurgan’s use of the colour field as a mode of display but in formalist aesthetics itself. 
Kurgan borrows the devices of colour field painting to exhibit digital images that 
appear ‘empty’ but are not; in so doing, she is able, by reintroducing the persistence 
of ‘content’, to challenge the notion of the self-evident (painting, photograph, or data 
that ‘just is’). The colour field trope, then, is a decoy that, to be identified as such 
must become part of an interpretive narrative within which it is revealed as a formalist 
stooge. But the formalist aesthetic itself must also be understood as a mode of 
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dissimulation in the sense that it is only through the concealment (erasure) of the art 
work’s associations with non-art that it can be said to realize its autonomy. Every time 
Greenberg, Newman, Rothko or Kelly insist on erasing, pulverizing, or eliminating 
‘meaning’, they draw attention to that which is not evident in the work at a single 
glance but can only be detected negatively by the vacuum produced by the work’s 
blankness. In this mise-en-abîme of seemingly absent content, what Kurgan locates by 
not not looking for something – by looking into the image and not glancing across the 
surface, by insisting on the necessity of narrative and interpretation – is how the 
diversionary tactics of formalism preemptively occlude the apprehension of content 
(history, politics, agency); indeed, the camouflaging of content must, by now, be 
properly understood to be the content of the form.
The trickiness here is not merely a consequence of trying to get to the bottom of 
Kurgan’s use of Kelly’s monochrome but is, in fact, I want to suggest, integral to an 
understanding of the history of the close links among abstract painting, surveillance 
technologies, and political aesthetics. One of the critical commonplaces that these 
links have given rise to is the observation that modernist abstraction in painting looks 
like aerial photography and/or camouflage; and that this surface similarity allows for 
a reading of photographs as if they were paintings.3 Certainly, the development of 
camouflage during World War I is hard to separate from early 20th Century painting, 
not only because, particularly in France, Cubist-inspired techniques were deployed in 
the production of early pattern disruption material. By the 1930s, the links between 
Cubism and camouflage were a well-established part of recent cultural history.
3
 On aerial photographs and modernist photography, see Shell 2012: 94; Sekula 1975 
; Saint-Amour 2003; Saint-Amour 2011.
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In a much-cited passage from her 1938 book on Picasso, Gertrude Stein describes the 
moment, early in World War I, when the painter sees, for the first time, a 
camouflaged truck and claims it a triumph of cubism. ‘[W]e had heard of 
camouflage,’ Stein writes, ‘but we had not seen it’ (Stein 1984: 11). Extrapolating 
from this moment of identification, Stein is able to retrospectively deliver an 
assessment of the relation between modern war and modern art that has proved 
remarkably resilient. Just as cubist painting broke from prior modes of representation, 
the ‘composition’ of the Great War was similarly not like other wars; it had ‘neither a 
beginning nor an end’ and ‘one corner was as important as another corner’ (11).
For Stein and Picasso, hearing of camouflage precedes seeing it. Being able to 
recognize camouflage as camouflage requires some knowledge in advance of what it 
might look like and what it is for. Before seeing the truck, camouflage is but a 
rumour; Picasso could, on the basis of what he has heard, have claimed camouflage 
for cubism already, but in Stein’s account it is only on the basis of seeing the 
camouflaged truck that an ‘amazed’ Picasso is able to cry out that ‘it is we who made 
it.’ Seeing is what counts here, unsurprisingly enough, even if the thing seen is an 
object painted so as to evade perception. Only when the camouflage is not functioning 
as camouflage – when it is failing to disrupt the perceived form of things – can it be 
identified as such. 
Conceding that the camouflage of 1914 belonged to Picasso, Salvador Dali laid claim, 
in a short article for Esquire in 1942, for the camouflage of World War II as 
‘Surrealist and Dalistic’: ‘the secret of total invisibility and the psychological 
camouflage’ (Dali 1998: 340). What Dali has in mind here is the application of his 
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paranoiac-critical method, whereby the paranoiac’s tendency to see connections 
between things that are not rationally linked together is cultivated in order to dissolve 
the notional truth of appearances. Such a strategy develops the displacements, 
diversions, and doublings of disruptive patterning into a factory for the manufacture 
of phantom enemies and terra incognita by collapsing the distinction between figure 
and ground, between forms and the spaces separating them: everything the viewer 
sees is potentially something else. The ease with which Surrealist investigations into 
the unconscious were, in the post-World War II years, as Raoul Vaneigem notes, ‘co-
opted by the dominant mechanisms of deception and fascination’ (1999: 60) – namely 
advertising and politics -- indicates the extent to which the strategic duplicities of war 
came to permeate the postwar world. Weimar Bauhaus artist Oskar Schlemmer, put to 
work camouflaging barracks in 1940, conceded that survival required ‘artistic 
neutrality, camouflaging one’s real intentions’; Schlemmer decided to devote himself 
to the ‘cult of the surface’ (Schwartz 2014: 168).
One response to an achieved Dalian reality where everything means something else is 
to renounce mimesis.  It is here that Greenberg’s defense of American abstract 
painting, with its emphasis on the elimination of content, seeks to shake off the 
combat model of the European avant-garde and its associations with camouflage. Yet, 
as we have seen, it is precisely through the renunciation of mimesis that abstract art 
renders itself almost sublimely amenable to the most neutralizing form of pattern 
misrecognition: the silent surface of pure colour as the warm bath of affirmative 
culture. If the triumph of American painting, and of American postwar culture, is a 
triumph of the cult of the surface, it is a triumph  also of camouflage – of hiding and 
showing. The two main modes of camouflage strategy, according to Hillel Schwartz, 
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are invisibility (hiding) and deceptive visibility (showing) (2014: 155); camouflage is 
less about completely screening off the hidden than of disrupting perception through 
doubling, obscurity, displacement, and disorientation using an array of masks, decoys, 
substitutions, and obliterative countershadings (156). Like the eliminations of 
formalist abstraction, the point of camouflage is to work hard to produce the effect 
that no work has been done at all. While protective colouration is most effective 
against the quick glance, the deceptions of camouflage are less concerned with 
fooling the unassisted eye and more properly engaged with disrupting the penetrative 
gaze of technologically-enhanced vision: of binoculars, telescopes and, most of all, of 
cameras. 
Ellsworth Kelly was one the many artists who served, during World War II, in the 
603rd Camouflage Engineers, the visual deception wing of the so-called Ghost Army, 
the US military’s tactical deception unit officially known as the 23rd Headquarters 
Special Troops. It was equipped with inflatable tanks, cannons, jeeps, trucks, and 
airplanes that were then camouflaged imperfectly so that enemy air reconnaissance 
could see them. Kelly did not design camouflage himself but was responsible for 
printing a series of silkscreen posters for training purposes, each of which depicted a 
particular form of camouflage (Behrens 2002: 173). Knowing what to show and what 
to hide, what the eye can register and how it is interpreted – the calibration and 
management of the single glance and the deep interrogative analysis of 
reconnaissance – are established aspects of Kelly’s work from the outset.
Digitalized Colour and the Return of the Non-Figural
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There is another reason, I think, why Kurgan is attracted to Kelly’s Four Panels and 
why she thought that Monochrome Landscapes could ‘converse’ with it. Kelly’s use 
of red, green, and blue seeks to establish a direct optical relationship between the 
work and the viewer, following Young-Helmholtz’s trichromatic colour theory, which 
produced the additive Red Green Blue (RGB) colour model that made possible colour 
photography and continues to be used in television, video and computer displays. 
Red, green and blue are not the primary colours of painting but of science. The RGB 
model identifies three different kinds of photoreceptors in the eye that are variously 
‘tuned’ to perceive primarily long, or red, wavelengths, middle/green, or short/blue 
ones. The brain interprets the light signal received and interprets its colour value 
according to the sensitivity of the response; the discrete red, green and blue panels of 
Kelly’s print are, then, as unambiguous in their messages as it is possible to be, 
seeking to reduce the necessity of interpretation to a minimum, just as the black panel 
signals the complete absence of light. The intensity of the red, green, and blue signals 
is full on, black is fully off. In this way, Kelly’s Four Panels reduces vision to its 
most basic components (the white border delivering the combined full intensity of R, 
G, and B), the primary materials of sight stripped of overlap, diffusion, shade, and 
combination. As the foundation of virtually all colour processes, whether chemical or 
electronic, RGB is the language of modern visuality. For Kelly, following Greenberg, 
red, green and blue is as close to direct retinal communication as there is, stripped of 
all association, all culture, and reaching straight into the cones and rods of the eye. 
Everything else is interpretation. As a crystallized example of formalist purity, a 
purity sought via chromatic nakedness, Kelly’s Four Panels promises, once and for 
all, to disambiguate the visual. For Kurgan, it is precisely this disambiguation that is 
the false flag of raw data, used to pass off intelligence as fact.
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As the model for all colour sensing, representation, and the display of images in 
electronic systems, Kelly’s RGB work unwittingly gifts to Kurgan a shorthand for 
what David Batchelor calls the colour chart’s contribution to the ‘digitalization of 
colour’ (2000: 105). Batchelor makes the distinction between the analogical colour 
circle of the artist – ‘a continuum, a seamless spectrum, an undivided whole’ based on 
a ‘grammar of complementarity’ and relational hierarchy – and the ‘grammarless 
accumulation of colour units’ that comprise the colour chart (105), the digital opposite 
of analogical colour: 
In the colour chart, every colour is equivalent to and independent of every 
other colour. There are no hierarchies, only random colour events. The colour 
chart divorces colour from conventional colour theory and turns every colour 
into a readymade. It promises autonomy for colour; in fact, it offers three 
distinct but related types of autonomy: that of each colour from every other 
colour, that of colour from the dictates of colour theory and that of colour 
from the register of representation. (105)
Bachelor suggests that postwar art, from Rauschenberg through Warhol and Richter 
to Noland and Kelly, constitutes a move away from analogical to digitalized colour: 
individuated, discrete, ‘no mergence or modulation; there are only boundaries, steps 
and edges’ (106). Removed from the ‘register of representation’, digitalized colour is 
the denatured colour of bureaucratized vision: autonomous units of colour unattached 
to anything but themselves, independent, interchangeable, grammarless. What Kelly’s 
RGB paintings and Four Panels are after, then, is not just the formal purity of the 
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single glance but the management of a glance that receives already rationalized and 
separated -- digitalized – data that blocks, unmoored from any grammar of 
complementarity, its relation to anything other than itself.
In her essay ‘Documentary Uncertainty’, artist Hito Steyerl describes watching a 
news broadcast during the first days of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. A CNN 
correspondent, pointing a direct broadcast cell phone camera out of a car window, 
claims that this kind of broadcast has never been seen before. This is true, Steyerl 
observes, because ‘there was hardly anything to see on these pictures’ due to their low 
resolution. The ‘green and brown blotches […] looked like the camouflage of combat 
fatigues; a military version of abstract expressionism’ (Steyerl 2007). Asking what 
this sort of abstraction has to do with documentary, Steyerl argues that it signals 
toward ‘a deeper characteristic’ of contemporary documentary images: that ‘the more 
immediate they become, the less there is to see.’ In other words, ‘[t]he closer to 
reality we get, the less intelligible it becomes.’
Steyerl uses this example to expand on the equally uncertain conceptual territory of 
contemporary documentary, which can no longer be satisfied with the discredited, 
positivist categories of ‘truth’ or ‘objectivity’ and must instead exist in ‘perpetual 
doubt’: ‘the only thing we can say for sure,’ she concludes, ‘is that we always already 
doubt if [the documentary mode] is true.’ This doubt is underscored in the case of the 
CNN images, produced by embedded journalists whose output is already mediated by 
the military. If, as Steyerl suggests, ‘we are all somehow embedded in global 
capitalism’ and the very idea of critical distance is never more than an ‘ideological 
illusion,’ the truth may well lie, not in any ‘objective’ report but precisely in the 
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blurred cell phone pictures – in the abstraction that represents nothing. Such images, 
she concludes, ‘are as post-representational as the majority of contemporary politics. 
But, amazingly, we can still speak of truth with regard to them.’ The form tells the 
truth, here, since the blurred CNN pictures are ‘perfectly true documents’ of the 
condition of ‘general uncertainty,’ of the ‘precarious nature of contemporary lives as 
well as the uneasiness of any representation’ (Steyerl 2007)
The challenge, for Steyerl, is in finding a critical position that does not merely take 
the condition of uncertainty into account or expose it, but which can replace the 
affects associated with perpetual doubt --  ‘stress, exposure, threat and a general sense 
of loss and confusion’ -- with another, yet to be determined ‘affective and political 
constellation.’ This is, I think, the dilemma of Kurgan’s Monochrome Landscapes and 
of other ‘abstract’ works engaged with the contemporary politics of visibility, such as 
Paglen’s drone photographs or Bloomberg and Chanarin’s The Day That Nobody 
Died (2008), a series of what the artists describe as ‘radically non-figurative, unique, 
action-photographs’ (Bloomberg and Chanaran 2008) made by exposing sections of a 
roll of photographic film to sunlight during a tour of Helmand Province in 
Afghanistan while embedded with the British Army in June 2008. Recalling Rothko’s 
desire to pulverize the familiar identity of things, contemporary artists, skeptical of 
the neutralizing effects of what Bloomberg and Chanarin describe as ‘the 
conventional language of photographic responses to conflict and suffering’ (2008), 
are positioned precariously along a fault-line between an always already suspect 
documentary mode and the risky maneuverings of formalism. In Steyerl’s example of 
the CNN images, the blur is the truth, but that truth requires a mode of seeing attuned 
to the misdirections of contemporary politics, the distractions, obfuscations and 
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double-bluffs of contemporary media, and the representational politics of 
contemporary art. Such a mode of interpretation – ironic, off-kilter, too easily 
mistaken for paranoia – does not yield the promised exposure of the hidden truth once 
offered by critique; instead, it is a mode of operations that at the same time produces 
and interprets encrypted data, much as the camoufleur, in order to manufacture 
deception, must also be able to read the signs of the enemy. The syntax of 
surveillance, with its repertoire of feints, blocks, missteps, distractions, decoys, masks 
and reversals, cannot convert signal into ‘truth’ but the protean maneuvering – 
endlessly showing and hiding, moving in and out of focus, in and out of range, 
switching between codes and across media – is perhaps as close to a critical position 
as can be reached; it is the a-positionality of counterintelligence.
This doubleness – that the data or image is at once true and false, evidence and 
artifice, real and illusory, abstract and figurative – does not necessarily have to lead to 
relativism and acquiescence, as if there were nothing at stake, but it does speak to the 
radically ambivalent situation of the contemporary photographic image. It is this 
ambivalence, I think, that leads Kurgan to yolk the satellite image with high 
formalism since each mode, in its own way, strains toward the promise of some sort 
of truth not as told but as found – the truth of the single glance that is beyond 
reflection. As I hope is now obvious, though, the kind of truth claims promised on 
behalf of the satellite image and of formalist abstraction are, in part, the product of a 
certain dream of retinal instantaneity and uncontaminated vision that, in order to 
work, must camouflage the operations necessary for the production of the image. For 
Kurgan, like Steyerl, the blur is a kind of truth, but Kurgan insists on a form of deep 
looking that is also made possible by the technology that produces the blur. 
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It is here that the satellite image reveals itself to be nothing like the blank surface of a 
screenprint (or, indeed, the conventional photograph) because it can, in fact, be 
looked into as well as looked upon. While skepticism toward formalism’s erasure of 
content exposes a conservatism concealed by the dazzle of resistance, skepticism 
toward digital images has, paradoxically, been accompanied by, as Mark Dorrian 
writes, ‘a deep and intensifying commitment to them that is itself, in part, a reaction 
to new powerful imaging technologies’ (2008: 106). For Dorrian, the crux of the issue 
does not lie in the relationship between the image and truth but between the image 
and trust; while digitization has indeed eroded trust in the image, it has at the same 
time become ‘the precondition for a new intensity of trust that is extended to it, the 
balance of responses shifting in relation to differing institutional and discursive 
contexts and the understanding of interests embedded in them’ (106). While the 
conventional basis for the photograph as evidence lay in its indexical relation to the 
referent, digital images have not so much destroyed this connection as they have, as 
Dorrian claims, transcoded the index; it is this transcoded indexicality that has 
redefined the relation between trust and the image. Today, suggests Dorrian, it is 
complexity rather than retinal immediacy that seems to be trusted: ‘what is trusted is 
no longer so much the image as the complexity or fineness of the informational 
content that can be extracted from it’ (113). At the same time, transcoded indexicality 
makes images ‘immediately and always already analyses’ (114); in other words, the 
gathered data is captured, processed, and arranged in advance of its apprehension as 
an image. Any interpretation of an image is, then, more than ever, an engagement 
with truth as it has been made (and as it is made to appear) rather than as it appears. 
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This is why Kurgan’s panels not only require informational support in the form of 
captions but also the interpretive supplement of the written essay; unlike Kelly’s 
‘honest’ and ‘objective’ RGB colour fields, where interpretative labor would signal 
the failure of the work to deliver on its retinal promise, the ‘honesty’ of Kurgan’s 
work resides precisely in its acceptance of interpretation as the work. There can be no 
legitimating single glance when it comes to the digital image because optical 
immediacy is always already camouflage, a diversion produced by the RGB system to 
make data look like truth. The detour Kurgan’s work takes through high formalism is 
part of the necessary re-ambiguation of the single glance that unpacks the strategies 
deployed by colour field painting to camouflage the construction of immediacy. 
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